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Endesa: the background facts
The matter before the Court of Appeal arose out of a dispute between National
Navigation Co (NNC), Egyptian shipowners of the vessel the ‘Wadi Sudr’, and a
Spanish electrical generating company, Endesa. Carboex, a sub-charterer of the vessel,
agreed to supply coal to Endesa. NNC issued a bill of lading for the goods,
incorporating the law and arbitration clauses from the charterparty. The coal was
discharged at Carboneras, Spain, instead of the contractually agreed delivery place of
Ferrol, and Endesa, as consignees under the bill, claimed damages against NNC.
On 23 January 2008, Endesa made an application for arrest of the Wadi Sudr to the
Almeria Mercantile Court in Spain. The same day, NNC issued a claim form in
the Commercial Court in London for a declaration of non-liability and to assert that
London was the contractually agreed place of jurisdiction. On 25 January 2008, the
vessel was arrested in Spain by Endesa, and shortly after, Endesa served its substantive
claim in the Almeria court. Jurisdictional challenges were made by both parties, and an
application to stay the Spanish proceedings on the ground that the English court was
first seised was made by NNC. Arbitration in London was also commenced by NNC,
along with an application before the Commercial Court for disclosure of the voyage
charter,adeclarationthatthearbitrationclausewasvalidandbindingonEndesa,andan
anti-suit injunction to restrain the Spanish proceedings.
Subsequently, the Almeria court ruled that the arbitration clause had not been
incorporated into the bill of lading under Spanish Law, and, even if incorrect, that
NNC,bycommencinganactionintheCommercialCourtinLondon,hadwaivedany
reliance on the clause. The Spanish court however stayed its proceedings pending the
decision of the Commercial Court in London regarding its jurisdiction. The English
hearing consequently took place in front of Gloster J, and a final judgment was handed
down on 1 April 2009.
The High Court judgment
Gloster J dismissed the substantive action before the Commercial Court for lack of
jurisdiction under the Regulation given the exception in art 1(2)(d), as, under
In spite of the unequivocal decision of the ECJ in The Front Comor [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep
413 that anti-suit injunctions are incompatible with the Regulation and fundamentally, the
principle of mutual trust, the Court of Appeal in National Navigation Co v Endesa [2009]
EWCA Civ has controversially opined that declarations of validity may be used as grounds for
non-recognition of a foreign judgment where the declaration is given prior to the foreign court’s
decision. This reading however is unlikely to be favourable in Europe, as declarations may now be
seen as having the same adverse effect as anti-suit injunctions. The case is discussed by Jennifer
Lavelle of the Institute of Maritime Law, University of Southampton.
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judgments within the Regulation, and as such, were to be
recognised according to its regime - a preliminary question as to
the incorporation of an arbitration clause in proceedings in
which the main subject matter falls within the Regulation’s
scope, should be classed as within the Regulation also.
On ancillary measures, the ECJ admitted themselves that the
proceedings which lead to the making of an anti-suit injunction
in The Front Comor did not come within the scope of the
Regulation. Therefore, proceedings concerning an application
for a declaration of validity of an arbitration agreement are most
definitely outside the scope of the Regulation; their subject
matter being arbitration, and arbitration being excluded. Nor is
it the case that proceedings concerning such declarations confer
jurisdiction under the Regulation on the court seised. As a
result of the arbitral exclusion, the lis pendens provisions do not
prohibit another court from dealing with substantive matters in
dispute. That is why, in The Front Comor, the Italian court was
not precluded from hearing the claim, even though the English
court had already handed down a declaration.
Further, anti-suit injunctions were regarded by the ECJ as
stripping another court of its power to rule on its own
jurisdiction, as non-compliance resulted in contempt of court
and potential penalties. Declarations of validity however, do not
have the same effect; they are neither binding nor persuasive,
and their practical result is seen much later (see below). For the
above reasons, it was the erroneous opinion of Gloster J that
declaratory relief, in contrast to injunctive relief, could still be
granted by an English court even though a court of another
member state had given judgment. A review of the Advocate
General’sOpinionconverselyledLordJusticeWallertocometo
the conclusion that it was not an interference with the
jurisdiction of a member state for one court at the seat of
arbitration to grant a declaration ‘as had occurred [in The Front
Comor]’; that is, before another court was seised of the matter.
The Judge continued to note that, as soon as a preliminary
ruling is given by a member state court, other member states
will be bound by that decision. The unsatisfactory result that
ensues from this conclusion is the likelihood of inconsistent
judgments between member states, yet it is definitely correct that
foreign judgments are binding and declarations are not. Gloster J
was therefore extremely mistaken in her ability to grant a
declaration.
Accordingly the court dealt with the question of recognition.
Submissions as to the severability of the Spanish judgment under
art 48 of the Regulation for such purposes were rejected on the
basisthattheywerecontrarytoTheFrontComorrulingandtos32
of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act (’CJJA’) 1982. The
Judge held that decisions on the incorporation of arbitration
agreements were so ‘very closely tied up’ with the merits of a
contractual dispute, that it was necessary for a court to
determine what the contractual terms are. A judgment on
English Law, the arbitration agreement was found to be validly
incorporated into the bill of lading. The application for an anti-
suit injunction was rightly rejected following the decision in
The Front Comor.
Evenso, Gloster J controversially held that the Court retained
jurisdictiontograntadeclarationofvalidity,astheEnglishcourt
was not required to recognise the judgments of the Almeria
court. Gloster J decided that, even though the Spanish
judgments were judgments within the scope of the Regulation,
theywerenotrequiredtoberecognised,pursuanttoart33(1)of
the Regulation, in proceedings which were not themselves
within the Regulation. Alternatively, the learned Judge opined
that, were the Almeria judgments required to be recognised by
theRegulation,itwouldbemanifestlycontrarytopublicpolicy
of the United Kingdom to recognise the Spanish judgments, as
they were obtained in breach of an arbitration agreement that
was found to be valid by its proper law.
Gloster J further held that English Law, as the proper law of
the bill of lading, should be used for determination of issues
of incorporation and waiver. Accordingly, NNC had not
waived its right to rely on the arbitration agreement by issuing
the Commercial Court action. Finally, even after The Front
Comor, Gloster J did not believe that the declaration sought in
the arbitration proceedings would be incompatible with the
Regulation, and it was held that negative declaratory relief
could be granted, even though anti-suit relief could not.
The issues before the Court of Appeal
The main point for the Court to consider was whether a
judgment of another Member State, ie the Spanish judgment,
which ruled against a stay of proceedings on the basis that it
found an arbitration clause had not been incorporated into the
bill of lading, could be relied on as creating an issue estoppel,
consequently preventing the English court from deciding the
matter differently. This required reconsideration of the
following issues: were the judgments of the Almeria court
judgments within the Regulation; were Regulation judgments
binding in proceedings outside the Regulation; and what was
the extent of the public policy exception. Consequently,
characterisation of a declaration of validity and its potential
interference with another court’s jurisdiction arose; the
fundamental outcome of which would determine whether an
English court could still grant declaratory relief in the face of
The Front Comor decision.
Regulation judgments and declaratory relief
It is clear following the Advocate General’s Opinion and the
ECJ ruling in The Front Comor that it is the subject matter of
proceedings which determine whether or not they fall within
the Regulation’s scope. On that basis, the Court of Appeal
correctlyagreedwithGlosterJthattheAlmeriajudgmentswere
incorporation therefore, is one to which art 33 of the
Regulation applies, and s32(4) of the CJJA applies to the
entire judgment.
Recognition of a judgment in arbitral
proceedings
The Court of Appeal correctly rejected Gloster J’s conclusion
that because the arbitration proceedings were proceedings
outside the Regulation, a Regulation judgment, ie the
Almeria judgment, did not need to be recognised. Lord
Justice Waller rejected the analogy drawn with the
questionable decision of Burton J in CMA v Hyundai [2008]
EWHC 2791 (Comm), holding that, even if arbitrators were
not obliged to recognise Regulation judgments, a court
providing ancillary measures via s32 of the Arbitration Act
1996 continued to be bound. Further, Gloster J’s ruling was
found to be contrary to the decision in The Front Comor, the
Court of Appeal finding that a Regulation judgment could
give rise to an issue estoppel in ‘proceedings excluded from
the Regulation as in any other proceedings in an English
court.’ For that reason, Gloster J’s reliance on The Hari Bhum
[2004] EWCA Civ 1598 was deemed to be excessive.
Public policy
Gloster J, relying on Bamberger [1997] IL Pr 73, alternatively
concluded (obiter) that the Almeria judgments need not be
recognised under art 34(1) of the Regulation, on the grounds
that they were ‘manifestly contrary to public policy’. This
view was rejected on the basis that, as the English courts were
bound to recognise the decision of the Almeria court, there
was ‘simply no room for any argument that in some way
public policy [was] being infringed.’ It was not for the English
court to re-examine whether or not the arbitration clause had
been incorporated. This view follows that of Tomlinson J in
DHL GBS (UK) Ltd v Fallimento Finmatica SPA [2009]
EWHC 291 (Comm). Accordingly, the arbitration
proceedings were dismissed and the decision of the
Commercial Court reversed.
Non-recognition of a foreign judgment
It is only at para 63 of his judgment that Waller LJ deals with
the actual effect of a declaration of validity. The Judge
tentatively observed that foreign judgments given in breach of
an arbitration agreement may not have to be recognised
pursuant to art 33(1), where a court of the country in which
the judgment is trying to be enforced, has already adjudicated
on the matter (see art 34(3)). On that reading, had a
declaration of validity been given in the instant case prior to
the Spanish ruling and a judgment obtained in arbitration
proceedings, the English court could refuse recognition of
the ruling. Although a triumphant pro-arbitration reading,
the judgment is clearly wrong in light of The Front Comor
decision. The ECJ held that anti-suit injunctions could not be
granted to prevent a person ‘commencing or continuing’
proceedings before another court, effectively holding that
anti-suit injunctions could not be granted at any time, which
in consequence presumably includes pre-emptive anti-suit
injunctions (those granted before another court is seised). For
that reason, it is difficult to accept that a declaration of
validity, which may have an equivalent adverse effect, can be
granted so long as another court is not yet seised. Moreover,
applications for declarations after a court is seised although
prior to its pronouncement, should definitely not be allowed.
Even though not binding or persuasive, declarations may be
seen as a way of influencing a foreign court’s judgment. More
importantly, there is no difference between injunctions that
restrain litigants in foreign proceedings and declarations
that allow foreign judgments to be denied recognition, which
is what Lord Justice Waller has stated the effect of a
declaration would be. If declarations of validity are seen as
a mechanism for the English courts to refuse recognition of
contrary foreign judgments, the ECJ are almost certainly
going to tarnish declarations with the same brush as anti-suit
injunctions, namely, that they undermine the effectiveness of
the Regulation and inevitably, the principle of mutual trust.
Alternatively, is a declaration of validity simply not a
‘judgment’ under the Regulation? Proceedings which grant
declarations of validity clearly fall outside the Regulation’s
scope and, unlike anti-suit injunctions, they theoretically do
not undermine the effectiveness of the Regulation, as they are
not binding on the foreign court. If so, on a narrow reading of
art 32 of the Regulation and a CMA v Hyundai-esque
interpretation, it is difficult to see how such declarations can
be regarded as ‘judgments’ for the purposes of art 34(3), and
accordingly, how an English court can refuse to recognise the
foreign judgment. In that regard, what purpose, if any, do
declarations of validity now serve?
Strategies aimed at minimising the effect of The Front
Comor decision are likely to continue as lawyers attempt to
find mechanisms for holding parties to their original
agreement. It will not prove fruitful however, to try and
side-step the ECJ decision. The Front Comor, even if
unsatisfactory for common law lawyers, reinforces the
fundamental principle that courts in other member states are
to be trusted to uphold exclusive jurisdiction agreements and
seemingly arbitration agreements, without the ‘help’ of other
courts. The battle to preserve the arbitration agreement to
what it once was will not be won in court; it is necessary
to legislate, and in that respect, until the European
Commission publishes the reviewed Regulation, tactical
devices to enforce agreements in spite of a foreign court being
seised will simply be in vain.Interim relief • April 2010 • Arbitration Law Monthly
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